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Book Reviews
The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs and the 
Future of Strategic Interrogation. By Alexander D. Corbin. 
Fort Belvoir, VA: Ziedon Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-578-02979-
5. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 189. 
$15.95.
The History of Camp Tracy, which received the Joint Chiefs of Staff His-
tory Office's Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Archival Research Award, is 
an illuminating and educating read. The book is written by Alexander 
Corbin, an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army with military intelligence 
experience. Corbin combines his understanding of intelligence collection 
with an historical examination of the interrogation of Japanese POWs to 
produce a work that should appeal to intelligence professionals and peo-
ple who wonder how we can prevent incidents like those at Abu Ghraib.
Corbin begins by exploring the dilemma the nation faces in detaining and 
interrogating terrorists with an Islamic fundamentalist bent. Not only do 
our values and religious beliefs greatly differ, but there also exists a lan-
guage barrier and differences in physical appearances. Corbin persua-
sively argues that the threat posed by terrorists is actually an experience 
that the country has already faced, albeit in a different guise. Corbin 
relates that Japanese POWs in World War II were also viewed through 
lenses accentuating their differences in values, culture, appearance, and 
language.
Despite the strangeness associated with captured Japanese soldiers, the 
U.S. military was able to successfully collect intelligence from them. This 
contrasts from the military's recent experiences in Abu Ghraib where its 
failures have been widely publicized, and also the detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Camp Delta. Corbin briefly examines the faults associ-
ated with these interrogation centers and then launches into a case study 
of Camp Tracy, the American World War II joint interrogation center 
where Japanese POWs were successfully interrogated.
Although Corbin persuasively demonstrates that Islamic jihadists are 
akin to Japanese soldiers, some of the historical parallels are not equiva-
lent. American society has changed since World War II, and it could be 
debated whether Americans today would tolerate terrorists being impris-
oned on U.S. soil, close to where they live. The author also states that 
there has yet to be proof that the intelligence gathered at Camp Tracy led 
directly to any intelligence breakthroughs. This is not to say that a lack of 
evidence presupposes that it does not exist, but it does weaken arguments 
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which seek to accentuate the importance of Camp Tracy and the value of 
intelligence gathered at that location.
While not everything that has worked in the past can be transplanted 
today, Corbin impressively describes in great detail the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures employed by the interrogators at Camp Tracy. 
These techniques, such as pre-screening POWs, false ceilings, the use of 
stool pigeons, and applying intelligence already known to psychologically 
intimidate POWs, can be successfully incorporated into America's intelli-
gence community. The interrogators at Camp Tracy, unlike many of 
America's human intelligence interrogators at Abu Ghraib, received an 
extensive education in Japanese language, culture, and interrogation 
training. These intelligence professionals continuously modified their 
techniques as they sought to improve their intelligence gathering. Most 
important, the interrogators at Camp Tracy never resorted to physical 
coercion or torture when interrogating Japanese POWs because of their 
education, expertise, and moral values.
Another major reason Camp Tracy succeeded was the total secrecy 
involved with the site. Not even people in the community of Byron Hot 
Springs and Tracy, which were very small towns, knew that Japanese 
POWs were being quartered there. It seems in this Twitter age we live in, 
that a facility such as Camp Tracy on American soil would eventually be 
exposed.
America's human intelligence collection could be greatly improved if the 
training, techniques, and culture which existed amongst the interrogators 
at Camp Tracy were replicated. The History of Camp Tracy succeeds in 
mining an historical vignette such as Camp Tracy to great depths, and 
then elucidating how this experience can benefit intelligence profession-
als. Corbin has ensured that America will not forget the lessons learned 
from Camp Tracy. Hopefully, these lessons will at least be partially imple-
mented so that America can successfully collect intelligence while also 
disassociating itself from torture.
Timothy Hsia has interned at the Joint Chiefs History Office. He has also 
written essays for Small Wars Journal, Foreign Service Journal, and 
Army magazine.
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Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on 
Terror. Edited by Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds. Surrey, 
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-7546-
7349-1. Pp 288. Plates. Figures. Index. $114.95 (hardcover).
This volume is part of a series on "Critical Geopolitics" edited by Klaus 
Dodds, an editor of the current volume, and Merje Kuus. The series seeks 
to examine the field of geopolitics, which the editors place as a sub-
discipline of human geography. The approach of the series as a whole is 
highly multidisciplinary, encompassing popular culture as well as issues 
of security, international relations, and global power projection.
There are several main themes that wend their way through this book, 
such as the spatial vocabulary of international relations—words and con-
cepts like "homeland," "international community," "failed state" and, of 
course, "terrorism." Another theme concerns the way ideas of security 
invoke particular kinds of politics; exceptional prerogatives and recourse 
to violence that would otherwise not be possible. At the same time, secu-
rity is as much about the routine as well as the exceptional.
Geography is the effort of humans to seek or impose order—geometries or 
power—on the world and its various topographies, or simply find mean-
ing in them. In so doing one tries to establish rules by which those orders 
function, rules which are constantly re-imagined and contested. This par-
adox lies at the heart of the War on Terror and the changing landscapes of 
security.
Questions of national sovereignty and the rights of one nation to inter-
vene in the affairs of another make up some of the most controversial 
aspects of the larger debate, and the essays in this book make an excellent 
primer on this topic. The authors take a realistic view in the sense that 
while the rules of international relations demand adherence to concepts 
like territorial integrity, national self-determination, and rights of self-
defense, cornerstones of international relations, these are also routinely 
violated on both small and large scales. The build-up to the war in Iraq is 
examined from several perspectives as a case study to such exceptions. 
For the most part they follow the debate to explain or define the "failed 
state" that is often used to justify intervention—and as the authors freely 
admit, for the purposes of enabling self-serving agendas of those who 
would intervene. The question of the extent to which the build-up to the 
Iraq War was based on intentional deception on the part of both the Bush 
and Blair administrations is examined.
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Most of the essays that make up Spaces of Security and Insecurity were 
originally presented as sessions at the annual conference of the Royal 
Geographical Society with the Institute of British Geographers in London. 
These sessions, which took place in September of 2007, sought to evalu-
ate the ways in which geographers had contributed to the analysis of the 
U.S.-led War on Terror, as well as the larger picture of contemporary 
landscapes of security. The papers contained in this volume cover a wide 
range of geographies, both physical and metaphorical; Afghanistan, the 
European Union, Iraq, New Zealand, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and the 
United States. The article on Sri Lanka, while informative and worth read-
ing, is nonetheless dated due to the conclusive end of the civil war there, 
which was declared ended by the Sri Lankan government in May of 2009.
In each of these cases, one finds stimulating and well-researched exam-
ples of ways in which one party or another's dominant vision of security in 
the War on Terror has woven into (or collided with) a variety of geogra-
phies, and thus become subject to scrutiny and criticism. It is clear that 
for some parties the War on Terror is incidental to the opportunities it 
creates, namely to facilitate moves towards a preferred state of affairs. For 
instance, in the "Introduction" by Ingram and Dodds, they point out that 
for certain radical Christian Evangelical groups the War on Terror is 
viewed not as a path towards security, but a plan to kill non-believers. 
Taking up this theme in a later chapter, Jason Dittmer ("Maranatha! 
Premillennial Despensationalism and the Counter-Intuitive Geopolitics of 
Security") shows how the apocalyptic leitmotif of global destruction, or at 
least coming years of "Tribulation," are viewed with enthusiasm by some 
members of that community, and how this is driven both by belief and by 
external circumstances of economic security as well as the clash of values 
between their own traditional beliefs and the modern world.
Another interesting article is by Nick Megoran concerning "Colonizing 
Commemoration: Sacred Space and the War on Terror" in which the 
author examines the use of religious ritual, particularly that of commemo-
ration and memorial, as a means of defining the War on Terror, as well as 
how the War on Terror has intruded into religious discourse. It is a fasci-
nating study on a seldom-seen aspect of modern geopolitics and the socio-
logical use and abuse of the grieving process.
For this reviewer, the title of Megoran's article was evocative of older par-
adigms, specifically the concept of "sacred space" described in studies of 
both ancient and modern comparative religion and championed during 
the previous century by a number of scholars, of whom Mircea Eliade was 
perhaps the most prolific and articulate spokesman. This idea, briefly 
stated, is that the traditional, myth-based nation was a heirocentric state 
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in which its moral, political, divine, and even cosmic integrity were 
defined and maintained by the presence of sacred areas such as temples, 
shrines, and other holy sites to which the social literally owed its exist-
ence. Parallels with modern notions of boundaries and national sover-
eignty are not hard to find.
To conclude, although there are some articles which may appear to have 
been rendered outdated due to the onrush of world events, this is not a 
book that should be ignored. Spaces of Security and Insecurity consti-
tutes one of the better discussions of the many issues surrounding the 
task facing any nation that wishes to co-exist with eccentric or trouble-
some neighbors, especially in a world where globalization makes virtually 
all nations neighbors, whether they like it or not.
Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D., is an independent scholar.
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The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional 
Intelligence Culture. By Ishmael Jones. New York: Encounter 
Books, 2008. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. 383 pp. $27.95. 
ISBN: 1-59403-223-8.
The Human Factor is not the ordinary 'kiss and tell' memoir and is unlike 
the flood of books assigning blame or credit to the Intelligence Commu-
nity for the intelligence failures of 9/11, the second Iraq War, the rise of 
radical Islamism, and the spread of nuclear technology to rogue states 
such as Iran. It also is not a deeply analytical study of how these failures 
occurred or how they could be prevented in the future. This volume is less 
of an academic study of the Clandestine Service than an extended self 
reported psychological study of how at least some of America's best, 
brightest, and bravest have been systematically demoralized and driven 
quietly from public service.
Ishmael Jones is a nom de plume for a clandestine case officer in the most 
secret part of the Central Intelligence Agency, the non-official cover oper-
atives, known as NOCs. These officers operate overseas without diplo-
matic immunity, often in the most dangerous assignments. If caught they 
are disavowed by the Agency, although they are often traded for foreign 
spies arrested in the United States. Without diplomatic immunity, NOCs 
lack the protection of international conventions covering treatment of 
diplomats caught "spying" and can be tortured, imprisoned, or even exe-
cuted. It would be an understatement to say that this is an inherently 
stressful job. Divorce, alcoholism, infidelity, and confusion about self-
identity are standard hazards of the job. As one former colleague of mine 
told me after his cover was blown and he had to seek other employment, 
"your entire life is a lie. You use your family, your assets/agents, your 
friends and your colleagues all to persuade the citizen of another country 
to betray his homeland. His life is in your hands, but the persona that you 
reveal to him is a lie and you are supposed to remember which side you 
are working for."
Jones' book was not authorized for publication by the CIA. He admits that 
he cannot fathom why. This makes it all the more intriguing. Who is Ish-
mael Jones and is anything in the book verifiable? Except for some exten-
sive quotations from the public record—much of it well trod ground—the 
answer is no. This limits the utility the book might have had as an accu-
rate guide to what really are the problems faced by the Clandestine Ser-
vice and how they might be remedied.
Instead, we are left with what appears to be yet another anonymous book 
of gripes by an unhappy ex-employee. Yet the vividness of the narrative of 
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Jones' career bears a whiff of truth when we compare it to other sourced 
and CIA authorized accounts that are every bit as scathing of the intelli-
gence community's shortcomings. Many of his stories demonstrate a wry 
sense of humor in difficult circumstances and are quite amusing. As one 
wag said, 'even if these stories aren't true, they ought to be.' What we do 
know from the public literature is that the Agency has been the source of 
enormous wasteful spending, poor accounting, sloppy security practices, 
and heavy handed self-serving management. Jones gives us a rare bottom 
up view of these problems, in contrast to the more top down academic cri-
tiques produced by college and university professors.
The biggest failure of the book is that Jones, writing at the end of his 
career, comes across as embittered, arrogant, self-serving, vengeful, and 
potentially violent. In a word, he is the perfect target for recruitment by a 
foreign intelligence service. This is a shameful situation for an individual 
who was (supposedly) a Marine officer, a genuine patriot who put his 
country's interest above that of himself and his family. He proudly makes 
the point that he was scrupulously honest with government money, when 
many of his colleagues were enriching themselves. Even if many of the 
details of the book are fanciful or have names changed to protect the inno-
cent, and, by the way, to comply with the law, Jones' story is a mandate 
for corrective action. For this we are indebted to him for baring his soul 
publicly.
Unfortunately, Jones' self-professed aversion to virtually any kind of 
management, which he lambastes on almost every page, makes his pro-
posals of correction of Agency management practices of limited value. He 
admits that he never personally served in any senior management post. 
Therefore it is not surprising that he fails to connect the pressures that 
senior management faces to the operational frustration he and others are 
forced to endure. His lack of experience in the maelstrom of the Washing-
ton interagency process leaves him insensitive to the conflicts among 
intelligence agencies and between the Intelligence Community and the 
Executive and Legislative branches. This is undoubtedly the product of 
being at the bottom of the food chain. Nonetheless, Jones gives totally 
unjustifiable short shrift to the value of technical means of collection, 
such as space based assets, signals analysis, military collection, and the 
rest of the collection apparatus of the U.S. Government. This leads him to 
commit factual errors in his book, such as his inaccurate allegations about 
the state of knowledge of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs—
matters well documented in the press critiques and the post 9/11 Congres-
sional investigations.
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Jones is right when he states that heavy handed management led to intel-
ligence failures, but that is true of almost every failure of large institu-
tions. His suggestions for flattening management have already been 
implemented in the wake of criticism of the CIA restructuring in the wake 
of 9/11, although not as thoroughly as many would prefer. His notion of 
shifting all domestic based intelligence to the FBI demonstrates his lack of 
understanding of how dysfunctional the FBI is as an intelligence agency 
when it comes to foreign threats. The 9/11 disaster was ample proof of 
that, as is the continuing bleed of vital technology information to Chinese 
intelligence operatives and agents in the United States. His suggestion to 
shift foreign intelligence to the military is undercut by the example of 
Pearl Harbor.
In conclusion, Jones has written an entertaining and instructive volume 
which has a definite place in the study of the intelligence process. Like 
every other study of what is inherently a secret business, it must be taken 
with several grains of salt. It is a pity what happened to Jones. He, and we, 
deserve better. The numbers of stars in the foyer of the CIA headquarters 
testify to the ultimate sacrifice of many brave and competent CIA person-
nel from every branch of the Agency. Unlike the dead, we fail to honor the 
'walking wounded' who should not also have suffered in vain.
Donald J. Goldstein is a faculty member at Henley-Putnam University.
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